I’ll be returning to Marx frequently over the next few weeks; his influence on social and ethical philosophy is enormous- in both the analytic and continental schools. Anyway, this is my two cents about Marx’s dialectical materialism. Someone asked me a few weeks ago, what I thought about Marx’s use of the dialectic method. First I should lay my cards on the table: I would consider my self a Kantian, I would also describe myself as having libertarian impulses with socialist overtones. Now this may strike many people as ridiculous- just an attempt to fence sit, and I’d like talk about the validity of this point of view later. As it relates to the task at hand, it simply means that I’m prepared to keep an open mind- I’m quite happy to take the bits I like and throw out the rest.
Marx’s inversion of Hegel’s dialectic may be one of the areas I’d like to throw out. Actually, the idea of ’the dialectic’ could itself be up for review. My first problem with stems from the dual nature of the dialectic; master/slave, proletartiat/bourgeoisie, teacher/student and so on. I know this is probably simplifying things a bit too much, but why are there only two sides to the argument? Why not a trilectic, or a tetralectic etc. ? This I think goes to the heart of arguments about pluralism; the us against them or me against you mentality is initself a gross simplification of both reality and metaphysics. I think, really, one finds arguments come from all sides- are pulled this and way and that way- some arguments support one another, half agree with others, would support the remainder, if the remainder supported them and so. However, Occam may have something to say about this.
Nonethless, the dialectical method is something I have to work with, and I can see its utility, even if I think its a bit too reductionist. This brings us to Marx’s inversion of Hegel’s dialectic. I don’t really have the room or the time (and probably the understanding) to describe this in detail. However ,I will say, that I think it doesn’t work. I don’t think Marx is right to make labour or arbeit, the grounding for his anthropology. The whole idea of ‘essence’, smacks of idealism. Furthermore, why this particular essence? Given Marx’s historical analysis, one could just as easily conclude that the essence of man is alienation, or selfishness, or even laziness. Again, I’m also compelled to ask, why just one attribute? (I am aware of the Aristotelian origin of this notion)The final difficulty, and I think this will become much clearer over the next few weeks, especially with my examinations of Lukács and Habermas, is that it doesn’t really seem possible to ground the dialectic in social relations. This leads to my final thought- why give priority to one side or another? Why not give equal weight to though/spirit and the physical world/social relations?
