Marx’s economico/political anthropology gives up arbeit, or labour as the essence of humanity. I’ve argued elsewhere that this seems too narrow, and am in agreement with Honneth that a weaker formal anthropology would be more appropriate. Habermas, replaces this concept with ‘communication’ in turn, Honneth feels that ‘recognition’ is more appropriate. I’m not sure that this is the right manoeuvre.
Honneth would argue that human beings do not become fully ’socialised’ just through language but through mutual recognition; the acknowledgement of an other’s self-worth, the generation of self-respect and so on. As an aside, the similarities to Kant’s moral philosophy are quite striking, particularly with respect to the various iterations of the categorical imperative. Moving on, Honneth argues that it is wrong to equate the the (chief) medium through which the activation of social agency occurs, with logic contained in that medium. Now, I don’t agree with this argument. Firstly, I should point out that I also disagree with Habermas- the when the ’system’ imposes itself on the life-world, it is meant to disrupt social communication, imposing its non-linguistic edicts on social relations. I don’t believe this to be true. Systems do have a language/communicative aspect- the stock market can interact in a symbolic/linguistic way with people, so too can governments and bureaucracies. Reification, in the Marxist/Lukácian sense, seems to be the more fundamental problem- abstract entities being granted human autonomy. I should also point out that I have a very broad notion of communication, drawn from both contintental semiotics and analytic philosophy of language. Anything that can be thougt about the world can be expressed through a language of sorts, even if a thoughts initial utterances, though symbols, speech or writing etc. are unclear- they are always open to the possibility of further refinement and clarification. I think perhaps that I would go as far to say that reason is itself language, or at least, can only be expressed through language- in the most fundamental sense, language represents the ability to recognise relationships between persons and things, and to communicate this recognition to others thus incorporating both the core Habermasian and Honnethian ideas.
However, can language (in the above sense) be separated from recognition? I’m pretty certain that it can’t- the way in which we interact with others must be able to be described or represented in some form for it to have any meaning and be acknowledged by others, in the same way that the ability or desire to communciate at all represents an act of recognition. Indeed, the concept of recognition can itself, only be expressed through language, and vice versa. Recognition and communication are fundamentally inseparable concepts, neither should be given ontological priority over the other- neither can exist without the other, and like the relationship between the individual and the society, their relationship is dialectical.
Recent events revolving around outlaw motorcycle gangs put an interesting spin on conflict between the Habermasian concepts of ’system’ and ‘lifeworld’. The internal workings of these gangs and their relationship to wider society are interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, the gangs themselves encourage a very tight knit sense of solidarity between members but the expense of fostering distrust towards any outsiders: ordinary ‘civilians’, the police, other gangs. This kind of mistrust and insularity has the interesting effect of creating its own kind of micro system which stands at odds against a multiplicity of other systems. Now, these gangs originated after the Second World War, in the United States, created by returned G.I.’s who were dissatisfied with kind of overly regimented life they had endured in the armed services, and these same gangs were given a huge boost by the Vietnam war, their ranks being swelled by traumatised conscripts and those eager to escape the machinations of a system which seemed utterly alien and alienating. In Australia, these gangs now seem to be dividing along racial lines; Shia,Sunni, Islander, European and so on. In each instance, I think it could be reasonably argued that members of each group felt, (or feel) that their life world, their beliefs about the way the world should operate and the their capacity for free and open communication with others was threatened. The logical consequence was to band with others who felt similarly disaffected, forming their own shut-off life-world. The natural consequence of this insularity was the formation of a system (with its own laws, codes and procedures) , which could not and cannot relate the enclosed life-world of the gang to the life-world of society as a whole, i.e., as mentioned previously a system/system relationship. The consequences of this kind of relationship are obvious; the gangs turn to crime as the only way their particular system can be supported, and thus wider society naturally comes to view them with disapprobation.
The common thread running through the works of Lukács, Adorno and Horkheimer is a fierce criticism of reason and rationality. I don’t think their respective positions are tenable. Firstly, their critiques come from a rational perspective; even if one doesn’t agree with the conclusions they make, one has to at least respect their method- an irrational critique is, by definition, a poor critique. Secondly, give the way in which reification, social pathologies and so on, permeate every aspect of society, what gives these philosophers any special insight into social problems? Their differentiation from the bulk of society becomes particularly problematic when one realises that: each of them came from a middle class background, i.e. they are products of the bourgeoisie, and, that they were all academics, an occupation that is at open to accusations of ivory tower syndrome. Thirdly, Marx’s criticism of rationality as expressed through objectification and instrumentality seems to be limited to the way in which reason manifests itself in capitalist modes of production and social relations. Now barring an endorsement of irrationality, the work of each man seems to contain an occult call for either a new type of rationality, or, a way of differentiating rationality into various modes or types.